Syair Islam Wasatiya

On 20 June 2019 there was a final cultural event, with music and one poem (by the author of this blog) and more speeches on the theme of Wasatiya. There was a good number of Dutch academics as well: in Islamic studies the Indonesians are now sending many PhD candidates and among the Dutch academics I saw Dick Douwes (Rotterdam), Thijl Sunier (Amsterdam, Free University) and Frans Wijsen of Nijmegen, the latter with a nice black pici, the nationalist drew, taken from turkey by the Indonesians.

While reading my poem on Islam Wasatiya I made a mistake and used the word Wataniya  or 'nationalist' instead of Wasatiya which stand for moderate, middle of the road between extremes. But in fact the word was often used to indicate the distance between Indonesian Islam and the Arab Salafi Islam.

Syair Islam Wasatiya

Untuk PCINU, Nijmegen-Den Haag, 19-20 Juni 2019, read by Prof. Karel Steenbrink

Tritunggal Priyayi, Abangan dan Santri sudah habis

Priyayi tetap ada, tapi namanya tidak laris

Abangan dianggap bodoh dan kurang persis

Santri sudah naik pangkat: menjadi akademis!

Bagi NU tidak ada musuh lagi yang namanya abangan

Sekarang yang ditolak diberikan nama puritangan

Atau diberikan cap radikalangan

Dari Arab mau hidup keterasingan

Kata yang laris sekarang wasatiya

Ya, jangan pakai salafiya

Jangan meniru keledai Arab dengan sia-sia

Terhadap yang lokal, ya, katalah iya-iya

Juga Muhammadiyah tidak lagi tolak TBC

Takhayyul, bid’ah, khurafat naik pangkat, sudah CC

Aliran ini, gerakan itu, ya, sudah ye-ye

Asal ada cap lokal dan asli, jadi OK

Islam Wasatiya

Nahdlatul Ulama also has a special branche in Europe, or more specific the Netherlands. In March 2017 they held a conference  to promote the concept of Islam Nusantara and in the earlier version of this blog I wrote some impressions of their conference in Amsterdam. This year the venue for their International Conference was at Radboud University, Nijmegen, 18-19 June 2019.
The concept of Islam Nusantara is still clear, but the central theme was Islam Wasatiya. The basic idea of the word wasat is middle, between two extremes, a middle course and in modern context als environment. It is in Qur'an 2:143 where the direction of prayer has been changed from north (Jerusalem) to south (Mecca), for the community in Medina. It indicates a distinct way from jews (and Christians) to an Arab Islam.
It is precisely this modern Arab or salafi Islam that is rejected by the concept of Islam Wasatiya.
There was more or less traditional music, singing of the Indonesian national anthem and the hymn of Nahdlatul Ulama, where the community showed their fists, prepared to fight for the traditional valus of their blend of Islam.

Below is the orchestra singing a mix of Indonesia gamelan music, Arab tunes and modern relipop. Above, in the centre is minister of religions, Lukman Hakim Saifudin singing, with his fists giving emphasis to the fighting spirit in this moderate style of Islam. In his speech he quoted the Abu Dhabi Declaration of the 'Human Fraternity doucment or Ukhuwah insaniya) of 4 February 2019 with Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar, Shaykh Ahmad el-Tayyeb as promotors of inter-religious harmony. The minister rejected extremism and respect not only for the major world religions, but especially local beliefs of the many tribes and regions of Indonesia. He quoted Qur'an 5:48: If Allah had pleased He could surely have made you opne people (professing one faith). But he wishes to try and etst you, so, try to excell in good deeds..

 From the European side the idea of Wasatiya was elaborated by Dr.Timothy Winter or Shaykh Abdul Hakim Murad from Cambridge (a complicated lecture about the 'green man' Hidr, Sura 18, Ahl al-Kahf) and Dr. Carool Kersten, now teaching at King's Copllege, London who gave an overview of the international use of the term.
After lunch there were many papers brought by Indonesians. Below is one presentation, showing how complex the moderate position can be.

A continuing colonial war

In 2016 the Dutch-Swiss Remy Limpach published his great book on Dutch crimes during the (lost) war of re-colonization of Indonesia, 1945-1949: De brandende kampongs van Generaal Spoor (The Burning Villages of General Spoor). More than 850 pages of large pages in small font. It has raised again the debate about the whole colonial period, and especially its aftermath after Europe (including the Netherlands) was set free from German Nazi regime in May 1945.
Following the publication by Limpach, the government gave money for a new research on the issue, with three agents: the Indonesia (and Carribean, including the other colonies of the Netherlands) Institute KITLV in Leiden, NIOD a research centre for the 2d World War in Amsterdam and the national centre for Dutch military history.

There are two contrasting parties in the debate about the uniliteral project of historical research (Indonesian parties were invited to join this project, but for various reasons found it not suitable to participate). One party is dominated by Eurasians in the Netherlands of mixed European-Indonesian origin. They find the leaders of the project biased: too negative about the Dutch efforts to interfere in the troubled situation in the country. They suggest that the Dutch only wanted to protect the lives of Europeans in that period, as well as break the terrorism of the small group of pro-independence freedom fighters. A group FIN, Federatie Indische Nederlanders are afraid that a one-sided narrative will be given, neglecting the cruelties of the Bersiap-period (September 1945-mid-1946) when freedom fighters from Surabaya killed so many white people, but also Indonesians who did not side with the wish for direct independence. FIN-people suggest that the Dutch army only wanted to restore safety for all people in a very turbulent and violent period.
The other side is represented by two small groups: Jeffry Pondaag of the Comité Nederlandse Ereschulden (Debt of Honour of the Netherlands) and Michael van Zeijl, spokesman for De Grauw Eeeuw (The Dark Century) who minimise Indonesian violence and want to consider colonialism per se as a crime.
Especially the last party broadens the theme of the research and probably this will be a more or less permanent issue for writers of colonial history.
In my own writings on Islam in Indonesia, beginning with the dissertation on the development of pesantren in the colonial period (1974), I took Dutch influence for granted, concluding that the dominant educational system in modern Indonesia was closer to Western culture than to the Muslim traditional practice. In the other line of research, on Christianity in Indonesia, I took for granted that Christian missionaries had an ambivalent attitude towards colonialism: it gave them prestige and money, but in the end they did not support the re-colonization efforts of 1945-1949 and were happy with the positions of Christians under Indonesian law (at least the vast majority of the missionaries).

Taqdir versus qadar in Utrecht, 1619

In the study of Islamic theology the concept of God's absolute will and power is important. It is often simplified as if Muslims confess predestination: all human actions are already from eternity fixed by God's will, taqdir. Some theological schools, however, were seen as 'liberal' giving more place to human will and planning, like the Maturidi, Mu'tazila, who thought that human responsibility (and divine reward or punishment) is only possible when human freedom is recognised, man as master of his own action, qadar.
Yesterday I saw a new book on a similar debate in the Netherlands, exactly 400 years ago, in 1619, at the Protestant Synod of Dordt or Dordrecht. This church council opted for taqdir: humans cannot do anything good unless decided and steered by divine taqdir.
This year there is much debate about this event, related also to the 'President' (or high administrator) of the Duch Republic, Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, who was executed because he opposed the feudal warlord Prince Maurits of Orange. In the theological debate it was Protestant minister Arminius who defended free will or qadar, while Prince Maurits took the side of the theologian Gomarus and the people of taqdir.
But it was not only a theological debate, it was also a struggle for political power. Between 1612-1621 the Dutch had a treaty of armistice, suspending the war with Spain. Prince Maurits was the leader of the army and had nothing to do in this period. He wanted to continue fighting and also conquer the region which is now Belgium. There was a peaceful party who wanted trade and expand the VOC for trade with Indonesia. Maurits won in 1619 and could continue fighting in 1622.

Frits Broeijer, my colleague at Utrecht University, wrote a book about the situation in my town of Utrecht. Between 1610-1618 all eight preachers in the Gomarus style, or defenders of taqdir were suspended from their churches and only sympathizers of Arminius were allowed in Utrecht. In 1619 Prince Maurits took over power in the town: he disbanded the local soldiers of the municipality, banned preaching in the Arminius tradition of qadar and he took over the city council, replacing all members with promotors of his party. In this vision there was some theological debate, but behind it was a political fight for power, then won by the feudal party of the Orange family, in case prince Maurits.
One conclusion from this: in theological debates one should also look for the political implications.